Foreign exchange option markets were active during and after the First World War. Heightened price volatility and U.S. Treasury efforts to financialize inexperienced, small investors encouraged speculation. Call options on German marks were the dominant instrument, but calls on French francs, Italian lira, and other currencies also traded. The largest clientele for the options consisted of optimistic investors of German heritage. The ultimate focus on less sophisticated investors, and the low status of the entities offering options, illustrates why option markets were locked into a position on the fringes of legitimate financial markets for so long.
if an individual's participation was seen as lacking. Individuals of little means were thrust into becoming first-time participants in organized financial markets. These inexperienced investors were soon seen as prospects by brokers who offered allegedly higher yielding investments. One such investment allowed European Americans the chance to invest in their culture by buying currency.
Other authors have briefly noted the existence of foreign exchange option trading during the period covered in this paper. For example, Paul Einzig, recounting the history of the forward exchange market after the First World War, noted that some New York banks experimented with put and call options but quickly abandoned the idea. He also moralized that it was in no way desirable for any banks to engage in such dealings. 6 Gerald Feldman pointed to mark option purchasers as evidence of the speculative interest in the mark during the early 1920s, and CarlLudwig Holtfrerich even reproduced newspaper advertisements for mark options in an appendix to his study of investment flows into Germany after the War. 7 None of the authors, however, elaborated on the social aspects of the flows within the U.S. or of option markets, which is key to the discussion here. I can also report a negative result: I examined a number of foreign exchange manuals published during the late 1910s and early 1920s and unearthed no mention of foreign exchange options.
There is virtually no literature on foreign exchange options as they existed before the 1970s. I find only a few meaningful examples. First, in discussing the activity at the Antwerp Exchange in the 16th century, Herman van der Wee notes in passing that options on foreign exchange were among the instruments traded. 9 Second, when the Russian ruble floated during the late 19th century, an active exchange market developed in Berlin. In addition to contracts for delivery of foreign currency in the future (i.e., forward contracts), cancellable forward contracts (i.e., options)
were also offered to facilitate trade. Consider a German entity making a ruble-denominated price to a Russian counterparty, where the Russian firm has time to decide to take or reject the offer.
The German entity faces exchange rate risk. An option on rubles would hedge the exporter's risk, as he would have the option to execute (or not) the forward contract and purchase the rubles at a price locked in at contract inception; this example and rationale appear in the German literature of the 1890s.
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There also exists an expanding empirical literature focused on pre-20th century equity option markets in the U.S. and England. Joseph Kairys and Nicholas Valerio use modern pricing models to evaluate 19th century equity option prices and conclude the options were substantially overpriced.
Scott Mixon finds that the price behavior of 19th century options, despite the absence of analytical and computational methods available today, was quite similar to option price behavior in the 21st century. Similarly, Anne Murphy finds a broad correspondence between rational option pricing and observed market behavior during the English stock market boom of the 1690s. Gary Shea has examined option prices to shed light on investor rationality during the South Sea bubble. A key theme in this literature is the evaluation of historical option prices with modern methods and comparisons of the trading experience across time periods. This paper differs from the aforementioned research in its focus and goals. The paper demonstrates how option dealers became identified with low status groups and how social networks facilitated this identification. The first two sections provide international finance background for understanding option market developments during the World War I era, including a discussion of the issuance of sovereign bonds with embedded foreign exchange options. The next section discusses the broadening participation in financial markets following the Liberty Loan drives and price volatility during the War. The following two sections discuss the short-lived ruble option market after the February Revolution of 1917, when Czar Nicholas II abdicated, and the 1919 rebirth of the market after exchange rates among the Allied powers were released from government intervention.
The discussion segues into the market's ultimate focus on German mark options, and it pays particular attention to the focus on less sophisticated, less affluent German heritage individuals. The penultimate section surveys evidence from the spot and forward foreign exchange business in order to validate the impressions given in prior sections. The final section offers concluding thoughts.
Foreign Exchange and the War
Quiet, stable markets are not conducive to option trading. Option buyers want prices to move.
During the gold standard, exchange rates were generally quite stable and anchored by arbitrage of gold versus currencies pegged to gold. When the gold standard disintegrated in summer 1914
and belligerent countries effectively went off the gold standard, the preconditions for an active option market were in place. War, but that number soared to between 150,000 and 200,00 during the War. Liberty Bonds were also available on an installment plan, allowing investors to purchase the bonds over time. A $100 face value bond, for example, could be purchased with $10 down and $10 per month until the bond was paid for. Large businesses financed the purchases of bonds by employees and would allow the employees to pay for the bonds with money set aside from future earnings. At least one large manufacturing firm paid an extra 1.5% interest to workers who had purchased Liberty bonds, taking the coupon payments from 3.5% to 5% per annum. Banks eventually financed the purchase of bonds over time, with $50 bonds being made available for $2 down and $1 a week payments.
War savings stamps were available in denominations as low as 25 cents, and these could be applied toward purchases of $5 discount bonds.
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The U.S. Treasury Department specifically established a Foreign Language Division to reach out to ethnic groups and exploited ethnic pride in friendly competition to drive bond sales. 22 The motives of German Americans were highly suspect during the War, and the Liberty Bond drives were a highly visible way of proving "100% Americanism". Individuals who were deemed as not purchasing enough bonds were subject to coercion which often included violence.
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Lizabeth Cohen has concluded that social pressures by businesses and the Treasury succeeded in stimulating demand for Liberty bonds. As evidence, she noted a 1918 survey of 600 mothers (nearly all foreign born) working as unskilled workers at packinghouses showed that 84% of the families represented owned Liberty Bonds. By the Fourth Liberty Loan drive in 1918, 46.5% of subscribers were of foreign birth or parentage despite making up just one third of the general population. These subscribers bought heavily, but in modest amounts; they represented just 16% of the total dollar amount of bond purchases. She concluded that these workers became more comfortable conducting business with commercial banks, and they also became accustomed to owning financial instruments through Liberty Bond purchases or employee stock ownership plans being offered to rank and file workers.
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The new, inexperienced investors soon became targets for unscrupulous securities salesmen.
Julia 
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It is worth asking how grown adults could be so gullible as to believe in a promise of 50% returns in three months. One factor to consider is that wages and prices were very volatile at the time.
Wages for manufacturing had more than doubled from 1915 to 1920, and prices had gone up nearly as much. Food prices had roughly doubled from 1915 to 1919, although some staples like bread went up only 10% per year while potatoes averaged annual price changes of 35% (decreasing in some years). 27 Stock prices mirrored these sharp changes: after troughing in late 1917, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 80% in less than a year but was cut in half within another year.
Immigrants saw the value of their homeland's currency vanish (equivalently, they saw the value 26 A detailed audit of Ponzi's books was presented at his trial. The summary data are reproduced in "Doubts Ponzi has a Million," Boston Daily Globe, The Market Opens, 1917
I begin this narrative by setting up the well-documented equity option market as a reference point.
Options on stocks were relatively common in the U.S. market during the 19th century, when they were known as privileges. The buyer of a call option, for example, had the "privilege" of calling for the stock at the prespecified "strike price" at any time before expiration, or not calling for it. The standard option was on 100 shares, cost $100, and expired in one month. An option buyer might find that call options on a stock were quoted at "1/8", for example, which meant that the strike price for the $100 option was 1/8 of a dollar above the current market price.
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For small speculators, this was a one-sided market, as they could purchase a call or a put but could not sell them. A few large market participants sold options, often through intermediaries who resold them in smaller amounts. Wealthy individuals such as Russell Sage constituted the bulk of option supply. This over-the-counter setup worked well to eliminate credit risk concerns on the individuals who wanted to speculate: they paid for the option up-front and received a payment, if any, at the terminal date of the option. The options usually expired worthless, because the limited supply of options generally meant that terms favored the seller: strike prices were set far away from spot and the stock never moved enough for the option to pay off. The counterparty credit risk of the seller, however, remained, and the market attempted to distinguish between option sellers that were credit-worthy or not. During extreme market downturns when many options would contractually provide large payoffs, option sellers were sometimes overwhelmed by the demand for 28 James K. Medbery, Men and Mysteries of Wall Street (Boston, 1870) details the institutional conventions of the 19th century equity markets and provides copious detail on option markets of the time. A call option gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the underlying asset at a prespecified ("strike") price. For the example described above, the call buyer could purchase the stock at $100.125 during the term of the contract, irrespective of the market price of the stock. A call buyer would therefore benefit if the stock price rose above $100.125 according to the function prof it = max (0, s − k) − c, where s is the market price of the stock, k is the strike price, and c is the cost initially paid for the option.
cash and defaulted.
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Somewhat confusingly, a standard method of purchasing stock was "on buyer's option". The buyer might buy stock at a fixed price on one month buyer's option, meaning that he could call for the stock at any time during the month following the trade date (and pay at that time). While the buyer had flexibility on the exact timing, he was required to take ownership of the stock at or before the end of the contract. This led to a terminology whereby futures contracts were often referred to as "options" in the newspaper summaries of trading.
This terminology and market structure carried over into the foreign exchange business. The
Wall Street Journal distinguished in early 1917 between privileges on foreign exchange (American exercise call options), which were "a new development since [the] beginning of the war", and options.
The option purchaser generally agreed to buy marks, for example, within 30 to 60 days at a rate 0.5 points above the spot price. As margin, the buyer deposited $400 to $700 per 100,000 marks ($18,000 of notional value at an exchange rate of $0.18 per mark).
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The New York Times and Wall Street Journal began carrying advertisements in March 1917 for dealers trading in ruble options, and the ads often refer to the availability of Russian, French, and
Italian government bonds. At least six separate dealers placed advertisements at this time. The standard option was an American style call on 1,000,000 rubles (approximately $300,000 worth) and expired at the end of 1917. 31 Interestingly, news stories generally discussed the market from the buyer's point of view, but some of the ads noted that the dealers bought and sold ruble options. The
Wall Street Journal pointed out that the purchase of the options was becoming quite popular with bankers in the interior, not just around New York City. 32 The ads and articles are also noteworthy in that they refer explicitly to ruble options (not privileges), although the word "options" was Foreign Exchange Market, 120, suggests that such foreign exchange contracts, where the buyer agreed to buy the currency but had flexibility on the exact delivery date, was an innovation from the 1960s, but they clearly date to earlier decades. 31 Recall that an "American style" option can be exercised any time prior to the option's expiration. A "European style" option can be exercised only at contract maturity. into the war, with the express intention of extending assistance to the Allies, is bound to steady the exchange rates of these countries, including rubles. After the war there will undoubtedly be a sharp recovery in all the exchanges now selling below par, and it is reasonable to suppose that rubles will not be long in recovering at least two-thirds of the present discount, amounting to about 44%, which would bring the rate above $.40." By August 1919, the Washington Post was reporting that buying German mark call options was a popular transaction. Calls had an underlying notional amount of 100,000 marks and expired in nine months. The strike price was about 15% higher than the spot rate; the spot was around 5 cents per mark, and the call strike at 5.75 cents. 36 A month later, one could find financial establishments advertising foreign exchange, government bonds from Argentina, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as options on francs and marks. 37 That same month, however, the Wall Street Journal was warning that "Trading in calls on marks is taboo with most exchange bankers." 38 The writer went on to note that only one or two houses did this business on any scale, and others declined to tie up the exchange necessary to hedge the option (presumably with the entire notional amount houses with outstanding loans denominated in marks. 39 The calls expired at the end of 1919. Such sales of calls would have produced a yield enhancement on the loan, even if the exchange risk were hedged with forward contracts.
Boston exchange houses claimed they were discouraging mark call buying and reported little demand for such trade. They cited difficulties in assuring delivery of marks and, especially, the possible imposition of German legal/regulatory bans that would complicate consummation of the trades. Elaborating on their reluctance to endorse the trade, they recommended purchases of
German municipal bonds as a better option.
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The institutional market in the fall of 1919 was apparently quite concentrated, with thin trading in other currencies besides marks. Virtually all of the trading in call options on sterling (90 day contracts, struck just above the spot price) at that time were due to a single banking house's sales to brokers and a few importers. Trading in options on French francs had also begun after the war, but that trade had come to a halt.
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Newspaper advertisements aimed at retail purchasers of options began appearing with greater frequency during the spring and summer of 1920, as the mark rallied. 42 Many ads offered options on marks, french francs, and lira, but mark options became the focal point of the ads. Option prices were roughly standardized in the newspaper advertisements, but the strike prices were less visible.
Many of the ads showed six month options priced at $40-$50 for a call on 10,000 marks, $300-$400 for a call on 100,000 marks, and so on, but no mention is made of strike prices. Actual transaction records are hard to come by, but a glimpse into the exact terms can be found in news reports. An example is a six month option on 45,000 marks for $150, struck at $0.0275 per mark. The news story, from October 1920, quotes spot marks at $0.0165 and forward marks at $0.0160. Given these data, the option would be struck 67% out-of-the-money and the buyer would not break even until marks could be sold at $0.0383 (187% of the spot price).
To get a back of the envelope idea of how rich that pricing was, consider the probability equating the expected option value at maturity to the option price (ignoring any time value of money considerations). Assuming the spot price would stay constant with probability (1 − p) and jump to the breakeven price by maturity with probability p, p would have to be 100% to justify the option price. Breaking even with lower probability jumps would have required commensurately higher rate increases. For example, if the holder expected the exchange rate to jump to 200% of spot, a 60% probability would have been required for the option buyer to break even. 43 At some price, the options would have been an interesting opportunity, but these prices appear extraordinarily high.
Apparently, only highly optimistic buyers would have been enticed.
A sample advertisement illustrates the pitch to those highly optimistic buyers: "LARGE PROF-
ITS IN OPTIONS ON German Marks, French Francs, Italian Lire. The Currency of these Countries
is selling at about one-fourth to one-tenth of its normal value. Large profits with small risks are now possible through the purchases of 6-month Options. Financial experts are predicting a sharp advance shortly." 44 The news story mentioned above, documenting the warning of the Washington Advertising Club's better business bureau against buying mark options, notes that "...economic experts have advised the local bureau that there is no probability of a substantial increase in the rate for a number of years." 45 The poor outlook for the German situation was widely understood at that time; consider the discussion of current events in MIT's Review of Economic Statistics from August 1920: "In short, Germany has been continuing at an accelerated pace toward the currency debacle which has overtaken her eastern neighbors. ... It is too much to say that improvement is in sight."
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It is worthwhile to verify that these options were, in fact, call options. Journalists provide 43 The general formula is to equate the expected profit of the option to zero and solve for the probability. The confusing prose regarding the transactions, often confusing options with futures or installment purchases of foreign exchange. As noted earlier, the old usage of the term option referred to noncontingent purchases of exchange, whereby the buyer deferred settling the trade until a nearby date of his choice (but he was obligated to make the purchase). The text of a contract issued by one of the advertisers verifies the call option interpretation and is as follows:
For value received, the bearer may call upon us for ___ German marks, bank draft on Berlin, at any time at bearer's option between now and January __, 1921, at 3 p.m., at $4.25 per one hundred marks.
Rothschild, Campbell Co, Ltd.
Expires January __, 1921, 3 p.m.
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Some of the interesting features of options, from a buyer's viewpoint, derive from the nonlinearity of the option payoff. Out-of-the money call options, with a strike price more than the current market price, cost less than the underlying asset, meaning that they provide leveraged exposure to the upside (relative to an equivalent expenditure on the asset), and the maximum loss is the up- these very bonds will be selling for at least $30 each within a month." 49 Opportunities abounded for the man with money burning a hole in his pocket: he was advised that $100 could make him $50,000 in a Louisiana oil gusher, or he could get in on the ground floor of the "Greatest Speculation of the Age ... the Saliger Ship Salvage System" which offered shares for 25 cents (but raising of the first ship from the ocean floor would send the stock value up 10, 20, or even 40 times the present price). Nonetheless, foreign exchange option dealers helpfully pointed out that they knew of no other speculation offering possibilities of greater profits than purchases of foreign exchange options.
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The perception of the New York business press was that foreign exchange dealing since the war was often the purview of legitimate businesses, but that many of the foreign exchange dealers that popped up since the war's end were "endeavoring to fool ignorant foreigners". The legitimate ones may have had quite a large profit margin, but this was justified due to the small sizes of transactions, as they catered to a clientele of "domestics and working men who remit part of their wages to mother countries." The opinion was lower for less scrupulous dealers, however. "Their method of business is as follows: Circular letters usually bearing a pretentious name, are sent to mining and industrial centers where a large percentage of the population is foreign. These letters point out the potential profits that may derived from the purchase, at present prices of marks, francs, and lire; 'if only these exchanges go to half their normal value, during the next six months,' or words to that effect. They add that in view of events abroad it would not be surprising to see a sharp upward turn in the exchanges, offering an option on a large amount of marks, lire or francs, for a term of six months, for the small sum of a few hundred dollars. These propositions, which offer possible thousands in return for the risk of a few hundred dollars, are obviously gambles. While it is not altogether impossible for these exchanges to touch half their parity within the next six months it is well beyond the bounds of probabilities."
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The Wall Street Journal disdainfully provided detail on the pricing practices of these small foreign exchange dealers. German bonds selling at 60% of par in marks, for example, would be sold to U.S. investors at face value times the spot exchange rate. Hence, a 10,000 mark face value bond available for $90 (60% x 10,000 marks x $0.015 per mark) from "reputable" bond houses would go for $150 (10,000 marks x $0.015 per mark) from the less established concerns.
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Option dealers even offered contracts for the investor with an extremely small budget. Buyers could pick up contracts on 1,000 marks for $5, or spend $10 for contracts on 2,000 marks. These dealers appeared to have been flexible, offering options of those sizes as well as outright foreign exchange. Rothschild, Campbell Co., Ltd of Massachusetts, for example, noted that "$300 will buy in German cash currency 10,000 marks. These have a par value of $2380. This currency you can put away and keep. On an option, $300 will control 100,000 marks, and these have the astounding par marks, $75 options were for 20,000 marks, $150 were for 45,000 marks, and $300 options were for 100,000 marks, so the firm offered a sliding scale with discounts on larger trades. Possible profits were computed assuming an advance back to par within six months. Even if the mark advanced to only one-half of par, profits would be over $7,000 on the $300 option. 53 What strike prices were implicit in these option payoffs?
To make a potential profit of $19,000 on such a 100,000 mark option, the strike price would have been approximately $0.048, around twice the spot rate of $0.024 at the time. This value was only 20% of the "normal" pre-war par value of the mark, and yet it represented a doubling of the exchange rate within half a year. Breaking even would have required the spot rate to climb to 217% Neithardt purchased an American call option on marks in the summer of 1920, he had absolutely no understanding of his transaction and was simply angry that he had lost $100. Or, Neithardt had actually purchased foreign exchange on an installment plan (the old usage of the term "option"), and he was simply angry the price had not increased to the point where he did not owe any money to complete the contract. It is difficult not to conclude that Neithardt was simply a man who spent his money foolishly on a get rich quick scheme and did not get rich.
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One Michael Sherry of Springfield, Massachusetts believed he was purchasing 500,000 Austrian kronen on an installment plan through Rothschild Campbell, Co,. Ltd. He was purchasing the currency at the rate of $7.50 per 1,000 kronen and had paid $875 (of a total of $3,750). Upon traveling to the dealer's office and finding it had closed and moved, Sherry became alarmed. (Note that kronen were trading in the interbank market at a rate of approximately $5.00 per 1,000 in late summer 1920.) To the extent that the dealers at Rothschild Campbell moved to abscond with the funds of installment purchasers such as Sherry, they were apparently acting fraudulently.
While the option purchasers were simply out of luck because they had purchased options that expired worthless, the firm apparently intended to defalcate with the money paid by installment purchasers. One can readily infer that, had the mark actually made the highly unlikely jump to 4+ cents, the firm would have defaulted on the options. 54 The 1920 Federal Census lists Hermann Neidhardt as a German-born, 45 year old polisher at a harness shop. It is difficult to imagine his being financially sophisticated based on this description.
Police suggested that $500,000 had been taken in from the scam in trades of approximately $100 each. If this estimate is to be believed, that translates into 5,000 buyers. The number of customers sounds large, but it is quite small when compared to the relevant population. The firm had offices in Boston, Springfield, and Worcester; these cities had a combined population of over one million people, predominantly first generation American or foreign born. Specifically, over 40% of the population had foreign parents or at least one parent of non-US nationality, and over 30%
were foreign born. on exchange rates of the European countries returning to pre-war "normal" levels. Small foreign exchange dealers sprang up to serve these desires, but they often had no intention of continuing business after accepting investors' money. These dealers also misled investors (who apparently wanted to believe) that an upturn and return toward normality was imminent for Continental exchanges.
One final note provides quantitative evidence that the market evolved along these lines. Anecdotal reports of transactions suggest a noticeable shift in trading patterns over time. One banker bought one year options on 1,000,000 marks in early 1917 for premiums of $6,000. Using the CPI and the exchange rate of $0.18 per mark, the broker spent $100,000 in 2010 dollars to purchase options on approximately $3 million of notional value. Standard ruble options were for 1,000,000 rubles ($300,000 notional) and cost in the range of $5,000 -$10,000 for near the money strikes in 1917. Ninety-day sterling options were for £100,000 underlying, or over $400,000 worth, and cost 
Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
In this section, I examine the evidence on the spot market for marks just after the war, as well as the market for forward foreign exchange. The first goal in this section is to understand how large the foreign exchange trade was in the 1920s, who participated in it, and what can be inferred about market perceptions by examining observable market prices and quantities. The second goal is to synthesize those conclusions with information on the option market in order to put the option market story into better perspective.
How many marks did American investors buy? While no statistics are available for the over-the-counter foreign exchange option market, there are data and estimates for the broad business of foreign exchange. Post-war purchases of German marks and German bonds and stocks totalled $960,000,000 in a 1922 newspaper estimate (80 billion marks purchased at an average price of 1.2 cents per mark). With the decline in the mark value since purchase, the value of the marks and mark-denominated assets was estimated at $56 million, leaving a loss of $904 million. 58 (I focus on this estimate, among the many that have been made, because the reports elaborating on the estimate provide the most detail on the U.S. population that made the purchases. This characterization, rather than a particular dollar figure, is my real interest.) Table 2 displays a breakdown of this estimate by Germanic vs. non-Germanic ancestry of the investors and whether or not the assets were in cash or bonds/equities. The data appear to have been constructed by taking aggregated estimates and apportioning 80% to investors of German heritage. The data also suggests that the average investment size was $91 per person. This is a plausible enough value, but the investor base of 10.5 million means that one in ten U.S. residents invested in marks, which seems implausibly high. Census data from 1920 record 8.6 million U.S.
residents with Germanic mother tongue (either foreign born or of at least one foreign born parent), which is clearly a lower bound for residents of such ancestry. 59 Assuming the total amount invested is as shown, if the average amount invested was actually, say, $300, this implies 3.2 million investors (of which 2.6 million would be of Germanic heritage). I find the smaller number of investors more plausible but probably still too high. The fact that the average note size for Ponzi's scheme was just over $300 and the total number of investors was around 30,000 suggests that the newspaper estimate is far too high.
The estimate explicitly covered investments in physical currency, deposits in Germany, and These components suggest U.S. purchases of marks in the $1-2 billion range.
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Stephen Schuker has also examined the estimates of capital provided to Germany during the post-War period and provided a similar total invested by U.S. investors ($1.4 billion). Schuker, it should be pointed out, noted that German Americans were probably disproportionately exposed to mark losses, especially due to holdings of Reich treasury bonds purchased just before the U.S.
entry into the War. He pointed to contemporary estimates from bankers suggesting that German Americans alone might have sustained losses of $1 billion.
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Who were the buyers of German marks? The perception was that the most sympathetic purchasers of marks were of Germanic origin. Perhaps some were reacting to the wartime pressures to invest in Liberty bonds and saw the opportunity to express their confidence in the German people.
The Washington Post stated that "Buying in America began with those who speak German, and they remained the bulk of the market. The millions of American dollars they poured into paper marks purchasing as soon as the Versailles peace treaty was signed in midsummer 1919, attracted the notice first, and soon aroused the cupidity of non-Germanic observers. The bankers, brokers, foreign exchange dealers here and throughout the country agree that German speaking buyers took 60 Holtfrerich, The German Inflation, 287 and 294. 61 Stephen A. Schuker, American "Reparations" to Germany, 1919-33 of the forward exchange rates, but the contribution here is to be explicit about the deviation of the observed forward rate from the theoretical "fair value" forward rate computed using spot rates and 72 Feldman finds that German enterprises were never in real danger of being "foreignized", but the fear of Germany being reduced to subservient, for-hire employees of foreigners stirred up nationalist feelings as politicians and busi- normal levels. This is consistent with the strong demand for currency options reported earlier.
The conclusions from this section are the following. First, the extensive work done by previous researchers on speculative losses to post-War investors in German marks provides a simple way to characterize potential investors in mark options during the same period. All of the evidence corroborates the idea that German Americans and other immigrants were disproportionately exposed to European currencies, especially the mark, after the War. Second, the financial firms catering to these investors were not top tier names. High status firms appear to have had little interest in entering the business of selling highly speculative foreign currencies to low status immigrants.
Third, market prices for forward exchange and volumes of physical mark notes purchased confirm the picture painted by contemporary accounts of a demand-driven market for European currencies.
Anticipation of a return to pre-War parities, or, at the least, currency values higher than the depressed levels just after the War, appears to have stimulated strong speculative demand for those currencies, including demand for options.
A final note reflects on the magnitude of the options market in relation to the magnitude of the broader foreign exchange market. The total of speculative inflows into Germany were probably in the billions of U.S. dollars, and the volume of physical notes or deposits held by U.S. speculators was in the hundreds of millions, but the actual amount of money that changed hands in the option business was probably a few million at best. Even if turnover in whole industry was, say, five times the size of Charles Ponzi's famous scheme, this would still amount to less than fifty million U.S. 
Conclusion
Cultural and national affiliations can easily trump traditional economic incentives. Developing nations, for example, have relied on expatriates with strong emotional ties who were willing to fund national debt at far below market rates. Israel has regularly issued these "Diaspora bonds" since 1951 to finance development projects and has raised over $26 billion in this fashion. India opportunistically issued such bonds during times of financial stress in 1991, 1998, and 2000 in order to raise over $11 billion.
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Fraudsters also exploit such ties, especially when they target inexperienced investors. A modern example perpetrated in the Korean community of the San Francisco Bay area is a textbook example.
The community had learned of the investment firm by word of mouth, personal referrals, and ads in Korean language newspapers. The performance history and the business magazine articles proved that the men had used their expertise in the exotic world of currency trading to make other families rich. Five hundred individuals invested a total of $85 million; after all, the firm's partners lived and worked in the community. But the claims were all lies, and the men allegedly used the majority of the investments to pay fake profits to early investors and for lavish living expenses. After eight years, they disappeared to Korea. 78 The same basic scheme has been perpetrated for centuries, and modern regulatory scrutiny has not eliminated it.
Many European immigrants to the U.S. during the early part of the 20th century had not participated in organized financial markets before they arrived. The U.S. Department of the Treasury urged them to prove their loyalty to their adopted country by buying Liberty bonds during the First World War; the immigrants generally did their part and more. But now these neophyte investors had small piles of savings in the form of safe, boring bonds; opportunistic salesmen offered an easy path to riches via more speculative investments. German Americans were disproportionately exposed. They had been pressured the most to buy bonds and to repudiate their culture, and the salesmen offered a way for them to get rich by betting that their homeland's currency, and by 
